HISTORY
PAPER ONE (P1)
GRADE 12
NSC PAST PAPERS AND MEMOS
SEPTEMBER 2016

ADDENDUM

SECTION A: SOURCE-BASED QUESTIONS 
QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE BERLIN CRISIS INTENSIFY THE COLD WAR  TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE 1960s? 
SOURCE 1A 
This source explains the reasons why the Soviet Union decided to build a wall to  separate East Berlin from West Berlin. 

 The existence of West Berlin, a conspicuously (easily noticed) capitalist city deep within  communist East Germany, ‘stuck like a bone in the Soviet throat,’ as Soviet leader Nikita  Khrushchev put it. The Russians began manoeuvring (attempting/trying) to drive the  United States, Britain and France out of the city for good. In 1948, a Soviet blockade of  West Berlin aimed to starve the western Allies out of the city. Instead of retreating,  however, the United States and its allies supplied their sectors of the city from the air.  This effort, known as the Berlin Airlift, lasted for more than a year and delivered more  than 2,3 million tons of food, fuel and other goods to West Berlin. The Soviets called off  the blockade in 1949.
After a decade of relative calm, tensions flared again in 1958. For the next three years,  the Soviets, emboldened (encouraged) by the successful launch of the Sputnik satellite  the year before and embarrassed by the seemingly endless flow of refugees from east to  west (nearly 3 million since the end of the blockade, many of them young skilled workers  such as doctors, teachers and engineers) –blustered (spoke angrily) and made threats,  while the Allies resisted. Summits, conferences and other negotiations came and went  without resolution. Meanwhile, the flood of refugees continued. In June 1961, some 19  000 people left the GDR through Berlin. The following month, 30 000 fled. In the first 11  days of August, 16 000 East Germans crossed the border into West Berlin, and on  August 12 some 2,400 followed – the largest number of defectors ever to leave East  Germany in a single day.

[From: www.history.com/topics/cold-war/berlin-wall. Accessed on 29 October 2015.]

SOURCE 1B 
This source explains how the actual construction of the Berlin Wall increased tensions between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. 

In the early morning hours of 13 August 1961, temporary barriers were put up at the  border separating the Soviet sector from West Berlin, and the asphalt (tar) and  cobblestones on the connecting roads were ripped up. Police and transport police units,  along with members of “workers’ militias,” stood guard and turned away all traffic at the  sector boundaries. Over the next few days and weeks, the coils (rolls) of barbed wire  strung along the border to West Berlin were replaced by a wall of concrete slabs and  hollow blocks. This was built by East Berlin construction workers under the close scrutiny of GDR border guards. 

On 25 October 1961, American and Soviet tanks faced off against each other at the  Friedrichstrasse border crossing used by foreign nationals (Checkpoint Charlie),  because GDR border guards had attempted to check the identification of representatives  of the Western Allies as they entered the Soviet sector. In the American view, the Allied  right to move freely throughout all of Berlin had been violated. For sixteen hours, the  two nuclear powers confronted each other from a distance of just a few meters, and the  people of that era felt the imminent threat of war. The next day, both sides withdrew. Thanks to a diplomatic initiative by America's President Kennedy, the head of the Soviet  government and communist party, Nikita Khrushchev, had confirmed the four-power  status of all of Berlin, at least for now 

[Adapted from: www.berlin.de/mauer/geschichte/index.en.htm. Accessed on 1 November 2015.]

SOURCE 1C 
This visual source depicts children playing on top of the Berlin Wall in the West Berlin  district of Kreuzberg in March 1972. 
HIST 1

SOURCE 1D 
This is an extract from a speech by President Kennedy of the United States of America.  He responded to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in Berlin. 

… We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either  gradually or by force. For the fulfilment of our pledge to that city is essential to the  morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the  faith of the entire Free World. 
Soviet strategy has long been aimed, not merely at Berlin, but at dividing and  neutralising all of Europe, forcing us back on our own shores. We must meet our often  stated pledge to the free peoples of West Berlin – and maintain our rights and their  safety, even in the face of force – in order to maintain the confidence of other free  peoples in our word and our resolve. The strength of the alliance on which our security  depends is dependent in turn on our willingness to meet our commitments to them. So  long as the Communists insist that they are preparing to end by themselves unilaterally  our rights in West Berlin and our commitments to its people, we must be prepared to  defend those rights and those commitments. We will at all times be ready to talk, if talk  will help. But we must also be ready to resist with force, if force is used upon us. Either  alone would fail. Together, they can serve the cause of freedom and peace. 
The supplementary defence build-ups that I asked from the Congress in March and  May have already started moving us toward these and our other defence goals. They  included an increase in the size of the Marine Corps, improved readiness of our  reserves, expansion of our air and sea lift, and stepped-up procurement of needed  weapons, ammunition, and other items.  

[From: www.history.com/topics/berlin-wall. Accessed on 30 October 2015.] 

QUESTION 2: WHAT IMPACT DID THE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN POWERS  HAVE ON THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR? 
SOURCE 2A 
This source outlines the involvement of foreign countries in the Angolan conflict. 

 The South African invasion, Cuban intervention and Soviet and American assistance  internationalised the Angolan conflict. Although the FNLA ceased to exist in 1976,  UNITA – benefiting from the extensive South African military assistance as well as  United States aid and a lucrative (profitable) diamond smuggling industry – built a  formidable fighting force of around 40 000 soldiers. For nearly two decades a civil war  raged between UNITA guerrillas and the MPLA government, killing more than 1,1  million civilians, mostly in the rural areas, where over eighty percent of the population  lives. 

The MPLA, a Marxist-Leninist party since 1977, expanded educational opportunities  and the health care system and nationalised industries deserted by Portuguese settlers  and foreign corporations. But its state owned farms and inefficient bureaucracies (administrative staff) only made life more difficult in the countryside, where roads  deteriorated and small farmers were left without access to markets or agricultural  inputs … President Neto and Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who succeeded Neto in 1979,  pursued pragmatic economic policies, permitting private ownership and co-operating with Western oil companies in exploiting Angola’s rich oil reserves off the coast of the  Cabinda enclave (an area totally surrounded by the territory of another country)…  Much – if not all – of the $400 million annual oil revenues were spent on the war effort … 

[From: Africana: The Encyclopaedia of the African and African American Experience, edited by KA  Appiah and HL Gates Jr.] 

SOURCE 2B 
The extract below explains the reasons for the involvement of the United States of  America in the Angolan conflict. It focuses on the USA’s attempts to recover from the  embarrassment of Vietnam. 

The USA wanted to prevent a Soviet backed communist government from coming to  power in Angola. For this reason, it supplied weapons, funding and supplies both the  FNLA and UNITA. This was stepped up after the American withdrawal from Vietnam.  The American government was keen to assert its position in Africa after its humiliating  defeat by the communists in Vietnam. They saw this as a way of restoring the balance  of power between the superpowers. However, after its defeat in Vietnam, the USA was  not prepared to become directly involved in the fighting by sending troops. They  secretly encouraged the invasion by the South African Army, hoping that this would  prevent the MPLA from coming to power. The effect of US involvement was to prolong  the civil war. 

[From: In Search of History by J Bottaro et al] 

SOURCE 2C 
This source compares two schools of thought, a Cuban and South African viewpoint on  the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. 

One school of thought (supported by the ANC, Cuba, other liberation movements and  several historians) is that South Africa’s decision to launch the attack was influenced by  their intention to rescue UNITA and their want to seize the town of Cuito Cuanavale  through the capture of the air force base. It is argued that the actions of the SADF prior  to the 23 March 1988 are clear evidence of their determination to break-through to the  town. The SADF forces attacked Cuito with the massive 155 mm G-5 guns and staged  attack after attack led by the crack 61st mechanised battalion, 32 Buffalo battalion, and  later 4th SA Infantry group. On the 23rd March the battle reached a halt. In the words of  32 Battalion commander, Colonel Jan Breytenbach. He writes: ‘the UNITA soldiers did a  lot of dying that day’ and ‘the full weight of FAPLA’s defensive fire was brought down on  the heads of [SADF] Regiment President Steyn and the already bleeding UNITA.’  According to this view, the SADF failed in its intention and was successfully thwarted by  the combined Angolan forces.  

The second school of thought maintains that the SADF had only limited objectives,  namely, to halt the enemy at Cuito, to prevent its airstrip from being used, and then to  retreat. Further action would have undermined negotiations between Cuba, Angola and  South Africa, which began in London early in 1988 and continued in May in Brazzaville,  Congo, and Cairo, Egypt. By this time, the South African government had already  recognised the political change in Russia and the ending of the cold war. Gen. Jannie  Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF, stated that the most important battle in the campaign  was when the Cubans were defeated at the Lomba River and Cuito Cuanavale was  simply part of a mopping up operation after this battle. Following this the SADF’s  intention was to prevent the capture of Mavinga and through that prevent assaults on  Jamba. This was successfully accomplished. This view is supported by the SADF and  several historians such as Fred Bridgeland, W.M. James and others. In addition both  SADF and military analyst’s statistics are mentioned contradicting claims of a victory.  Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF, quoted the following in support of this  argument: CUBA/FAPLA Tanks destroyed: 94, SADF tanks destroyed: 3, Cuban troop  carriers destroyed: 100, SADF troop carriers destroyed: 5 logistical vehicles destroyed:  389 for Cuba and 1 for SADF. 

[From:www.sahistory.org.za/tops/battle-cuito-cuanavale. Accessed on 26 October 2015.]

SOURCE 2D 
This photograph shows the South African Defence Force recruits making their weapons  safe before entering the base at Ruacana in 1988 during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.  It is adapted from a newspaper article, The Mother of Liberation Battles. 

 22 South African Defence Force recruits making their weapons safe

[Source: The Mother of Liberation Battles’, an article by Ronnie Kasrils, From: Sunday Independent,  24 March 2013]

QUESTION 3: HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THE DESEGREGATION OF CENTRAL  HIGH SCHOOL IN LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, IN 1957? 
SOURCE 3A 
The source below is an extract taken from notes by President Dwight Eisenhower on 8  October 1957 after his meeting with Governor Faubus. It focuses on the visit of  Governor Faubus of Arkansas to Little Rock on 14 September 1957. The meeting took  place in Newport. 

Governor Faubus protested again and again that he was a law abiding citizen, that he  was a veteran, fought in the war, and that everybody recognises that the Federal law is  supreme to State law. So I suggested to him that he go home and not necessarily withdraw the National Guard troops, but just change their orders to say that having  been assured that there was no attempt to do anything except to obey the Courts and  that the Federal government was not trying to do anything that had not been already  agreed to by the School Board and directed by the Courts; that he should tell the Guard  to continue to preserve order but to allow the Negro children to attend Central High  School. I pointed out at that time he was due to appear the following Friday, the 20th,  before the Court to determine whether an injunction (compelling court order) was to be  issued … I further said that I did not believe it was to anybody to have a trial of strength  between the President and a Governor because in any area where the Federal 

government had assumed jurisdiction (authority) and this was upheld by the Supreme  Court, there could be only one outcome … that is, the State would lose, and I did not  want to see any Governor humiliated. 
He seemed to be very appreciative of this attitude and I got definitely the understanding  that he was going back to Arkansas to act within a matter of hours to revoke (reverse)  his orders to the Guard to prevent re-entry of the Negro children into the school. He  told me of his war experiences and vigorously asserted his deep feelings of loyalty and  dedication to the Federal government, and repeated several times that he had shown  respect for the law in all his actions. 

[From: www.mhunt.weebly.com. Accessed on 13 November 2015.]

SOURCE 3B 
This is a statement by the Governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, after his meeting with President Dwight Eisenhower in September 1957. It outlines the incident at Central  High School in Little Rock, Arkansas.  

 … I have assured the President on my desire to cooperate with him in carrying out the  duties resting upon both of us under the Federal Constitution. In addition, I must  harmonise (bring in line with) my actions under the Constitution of Arkansas with the  requirements of the Constitution of the United States. 

I have never expressed any personal opinion regarding the Supreme Court decision of  1954 [Brown v Board of Education] which ordered integration. This is not relevant. That decision is the law of the land and must be obeyed. At the same time it is evident from  the language of the decision itself that changes necessitated by the Court orders  cannot be accomplished overnight. The people of Little Rock are law-abiding and I  know that they expect to obey valid court orders. In this they shall have my support. 
In so doing it is my responsibility to protect the people from violence of any form. As I  interpret the President’s public statements, the national Administration has no thought  of challenging this fact. In meeting this obligation, it is essential that, in proceeding to  implement the orders of the Court, the complexities of integration be patiently  understood by all those in Federal authority. When I assured the President … that I  expect to accept the decision of the Courts, I entertained the hope that the Department  of Justice and the Federal Judiciary will act with understanding and patience in  discharging their duties. 

[From: www.ourdocuments.gov. Accessed on 14 November 2015.]

SOURCE 3C 
This extract describes the hardships that the African American students, who attended  the ‘all-white’ Central High School. It also focuses on how their families were harassed. 

Although some of the students, teachers and administration attempted to maintain a  sense of normality, for the nine students that integrated Central High School it was like  going to war every day. One of the Little Rock Nine, Melba Pattilo Beals, describes their  experience in her book, Warriors Don’t Cry: ‘My eight friends and I paid for the  integration of Central High with our innocence. During those years when we desperately  needed approval from our peers, we were victims of the harshest rejection imaginable.  The physical and psychological punishment we endured profoundly affected our lives. It  transformed us into warriors who dared not cry even when we suffered intolerable pain.’ 
Integration affected both their lives at school and at home. At school these students  were elbowed, poked, kicked, punched and pushed. They faced verbal abuse from  segregationists as well as death threats against themselves, their families and members  of the black community. At home, their families endured threatening phone calls; some  of the parents lost their jobs, and the black community as a whole was harassed by  bomb threats, gunshots, and bricks thrown through windows. While the students  received some support from their community, they also were alienated by those who felt  their actions jeopardised (put in danger) the safety of others. 

[From: www.nps.gov/history/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons . Accessed on 14 November 2015.] 

SOURCE 3D 

This photograph shows some African and White American students interacting at Central  High School in 1957. 
HIST 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:  

Last modified on Friday, 13 August 2021 12:30